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Deep learning models on graphs have achieved remarkable performance in various graph analysis tasks, e.g.,
node classication, link prediction and graph clustering. However, they expose uncertainty and unreliability
against the well-designed inputs, i.e., adversarial examples. Accordingly, a line of studies have emerged for both
aack and defense addressed in dierent graph analysis tasks, leading to the arms race in graph adversarial
learning.
Despite the booming works, there still lacks a unied problem denition and a comprehensive review.
To bridge this gap, we investigate and summarize the existing works on graph adversarial learning tasks
systemically. Specically, we survey and unify the existing works w.r.t. aack and defense in graph analysis
tasks, and give appropriate denitions and taxonomies at the same time. Besides, we emphasize the importance
of related evaluation metrics, investigate and summarize them comprehensively. Hopefully, our works can
provide a comprehensive overview and oer insights for the relevant researchers. More details of our works
are available at hps://github.com/gitgiter/Graph-Adversarial-Learning.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, deep learning has enjoyed the status of crown jewels in articial intelligence,
which shows an impressive performance in various applications, including speech and language
processing [19, 74], face recognition [47] and object detection [35]. However, the frequently used
deep learning models recently have been proved unstable and unreliable due to the vulnerability
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Fig. 1. A misclassification of the target caused by a small perturbations of the graph structure and node
features.
against perturbations. For example, slight changes on several pixels of a picture, which appears
imperceptible for human eyes but strongly aect the outputs of deep learning models [46]. As stated
by Szegedy et al. [61], deep learning models that are well-dened and learned by backpropagation
have intrinsic blind spots and non-intuitive characteristics, which should have been generalized to
the data distribution in an obvious way.
On the other hand, deep learning on graphs has received signicant research interest recently.
As a powerful representation, graph plays an important role and has been widely applied in real
world [27]. Naturally, deep learning’s research on graph is also a hot topic and brings lots of
refreshing implementations in dierent elds, such as social networks [48], e-commence networks
[66] and recommendation systems [15, 73]. Unfortunately, graph analysis domain, a crucial eld of
machine learning, has also exposed the vulnerability of deep learning models against well-designed
aacks [85, 87]. For example, consider the task of node classication, aackers usually have control
over several fake nodes, aim to fool the target classiers, leading to misclassication by adding
or removing edges between fake nodes and other benign ones. As shown in Figure 1, performing
small perturbations (two added links and several changed features of nodes) on a clean graph can
lead to the misclassication of deep graph learning models.
With rising concerns being paid on the security of graph models, there exists a surge of researches
on graph adversarial learning, i.e., a eld on studying the security and vulnerability of graph models.
On one hand, from the perspective of aacking a graph learning model, Zu¨gner et al. [85] rst
study adversarial aacks on graph data, with lile perturbations on node features and graph
structure, the target classiers are easily fooled and misclassify specied nodes. On the other
hand, Wang et al. [67] propose a modied Graph Convolution Networks (GCNs) model with
an adversarial defense framework to improve its robustness. Moreover, Sun et al. [57] study
the existing works of adversarial aack and defense strategies on graph data and discuss their
corresponding contributions and limitations. However, they mainly focus on the aspect of the
adversarial aack, leaving works on defense unexplored.
Challenges. Despite a surge of works on the graph adversarial learning, there still exists several
problems to solve. i) Unied and specied formulation. Current studies consider the problem
denition and assumptions in graph adversarial learning with their own mathematical formulations
and mostly lack of detailed explanations, which eectively hinders the progress of follow-up
studies. ii) Related evaluation metrics. While for various tasks, evaluation metrics on corresponding
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performance are rather dierent, and even have diverse standardization on it. Besides, special
metrics for the graph adversarial learning scenario are necessary and timely to explore, e.g.,
evaluation on the aack impacts.
For the problem of inconsistent formulations and denitions, we survey the existing aack and
defense works, give unied denitions and categorize them from diverse perspectives. Although
there have been some eorts [20, 39, 85] to generalize the denitions, most formulations still make
customization for their own models. So far, only one article [57] outlines these concepts from
a review perspective, which is not sucient to summarize the existing works comprehensively.
Based on the previous literature, we summarize the dierent types of graphs and introduce the
three main tasks according to the level, and subsequently give the unied formulations of aack
and defense in Section 3.1 and 4.1, respectively.
Dierent models have various metrics due to dierent emphasis. To provide guidance for
researchers and beer evaluate their adversarial models, we have a more detailed summarize and
discussion on metrics in Section 5. In particular, we rst introduce some common metrics for both
aack and defense, and then present some special metrics provided in their respective works from
three categories: eectiveness, eciency, and imperceptibility. For instance, the Aack Success
Rate (ASR) [10] and the Average Defense Rate (ADR) [11] are proposed to measure the eectiveness
of aack and defense, respectively.
In summary, our contributions can be listed as bellow:
• We thoroughly investigate related works in this area, and subsequently give the unied
problem formulations and the clear denitions for current inconsistent concepts of both
aack and defense.
• We give a clear overview on existing works and classify them from dierent perspectives
based on reasonable criteria systematically.
• We emphasize the importance of evaluation metrics and investigate them to make a com-
prehensively summary.
• For such an emerging research area, we point out the limitations of current researches and
provide some open questions to solve.
e survey is organized as follow. In Section 2, we will give some basic notations of typical graphs.
In Section 3 and Section 4, we will separately introduce the denitions, taxonomies of adversarial
aack and defense on graph data, and further give a clear overview. We then summarize the related
metrics in Section 5 and try to discuss some open research questions in Section 6. Finally, we draw
our conclusion in Section 7.
2 PRELIMINARY
Focusing on the graph structure data, we rst give notations of typical graphs for simplicity and
further introduce the mainstream tasks in graph analysis elds. e most frequently used symbols
are summarized in Table 1.
2.1 Notations
Generally, a graph is represented as G = (V, E), where V = {v1,v2, . . . ,vN } denotes the set
of N nodes and E = {e1, e2, . . . , eM } is the set of M existing edges in the graph, and naturally
E ⊆ V ×V . e connections of the graph could be represented as an adjacency matrix A ∈ RN×N ,
where Ai, j , 0 if there is an edge from node vi to node vj and Ai, j = 0 otherwise.
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Table 1. Summary of notations.
Symbol Description Symbol Description Symbol Description
N number of nodes M number of edges n number of graphs
F(·)
number of features w.r.t.
nodes F(node) or edges F(edдe)
G˜
a graph instance, denoting
a clean graph G or a modied graph Gˆ C
set of pre-dened class labels
for nodes, edges or graphs
V set of nodesV = {v1,v2, . . . ,vN } E set of edges E = {e1, e2, . . . , eM } G set of graphs G = {G1,G2, . . . ,Gn}
D the whole dataset,D = (G,X ,C) S set of instances, could be G,V , or E SL
set of labeled instances, could be
GL ,VL , or EL , SL ⊂ S
T set of unlabeled instanceswhere T ⊂ S − SL or T = S − SL K aackers’ knowledge of the dataset O
operation set
w.r.t. aackers’ manipulation
A adjacency matrix A ∈ RN×N A′ modied adjacency matrix X feature matrix
X ∈ {0, 1}N×F(·) or X ∈ RN×F(·)
X ′ modied feature matrix f deep learning model w.r.t. inductivelearning f (ind ) or transductive learning f (tra) fˆ surrogate model
f˜ well-designed model for defense θ set of parametersw.r.t. a specic model Z output of the model
t
target instance,
can be a node, an edge or a graph ∆ aack budgets y
ground-truth label
w.r.t. an instance, y ∈ C
Ψ
perturbation space
of aacks L
loss function of
deep learning model Q
similarity function
of graphs
2.2 Taxonomies of Graphs
Dierent scenarios correspond to various types of graphs, hence we will introduce them further in
the following parts based on the basic graph denition in Section 2.1.
Directed and Undirected Graph. Directed graph, also called a digraph or a directed network,
is a graph where all the edges are directed from one node to another  but not backwards [7].
On the contrary, a graph where the edges are bidirectional is called an undirected graph. For
undirected graphs, the convention for denoting the adjacency matrix doesn’t maer, as all edges
are bidirectional. Generally, Ai, j , Aj,i for directed graph and Ai, j = Aj,i for undirected graph.
Weighted and Unweighted Graph. Typically a weighted graph refers to an edge-weighted
graph where each edge is associated with a real value [7]. An unweighted graph may be used if a
relationship in terms of magnitude doesnt exist, i.e., the connections between edges are treated as
the same.
Aributed Graph. An aributed graph refers to a graph where both node and edge are available
to have its own aributes/features [23]. Specically, the aributes of nodes and edges could be
denoted as Xnode ∈ RN×Fnode and Xedдe ∈ RM×Fedдe , respectively. In most cases a graph usually
have aributes associated with nodes only, we use X to denote the node aributes/features for
brevity.
Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Information Graph. As well as aributes, the type of
nodes or edges is another important property. A graph G is called heterogeneous information
graph if there are two or more types of objects/nodes or relations/edges in it [30, 37]; otherwise, it
is called a homogeneous information graph.
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Dynamic and Static Graph. Intuitively, nodes, edges and aributes are possibly changing over
time in a dynamic graph [41], which could be represented at G(t ) at time t . For a static graph, which
is simply dened as G, in which nodes, edges and aributes remain the same as the time changes.
Each type of graph has dierent strengths and weaknesses. It’s beer to pick the appropriate
kind of graph to model the problem. As existing works are mainly focus on a simple graph, i.e.,
undirected and unweighted. Besides, they assume that the graph is static and homogeneous for
simplicity. By default, the mentioned “graph” refers to “simple graph” in this paper.
2.3 Graph Analysis Tasks
In this section, we will introduce the major tasks of graph analysis, in which deep learning models
are commonly applied to. From the perspective of nodes, edges and graphs, we divide these tasks
into three categories: node-, link- and graph-level task.
Node-level Task. Node classication is one of the most common node-level tasks, for instance,
identifying a person in a social network. Given a graph G, with partial labeled nodesVL ⊆ V and
other unlabeled ones, the goal of classiers is to learn a mapping function ϕ : V → C, where C is
a set of pre-dened class labels. e learned mapping function is applied to eectively identify the
class labels for the unlabeled nodes [34]. To this end, inductive learning and transductive learning
seings are specied based on the characteristic of training and testing procedures.
• Inductive Seing. For the inductive learning seing, a classier is usually trained on a set
of nodes and tested on others that never seen during training.
• Transductive Seing. Dierent from inductive seing, test samples (i.e., the unlabeled nodes)
can be seen (but not their labels!) during the training procedure in transductive learning
seing.
To conclude, the objective function that optimized by the classier could be formulated as follows:
L =
1
|VL |
∑
vi ∈VL
L(fθ (G,X ),yi ) (1)
where yi is the class label of node vi , and L could be the loss of either inductive learning or
transductive learning, and the classier f with parameters θ is similarly dened with the two
seings.
Link-level Task. Link-level task relates to the edge classication and link prediction. Among
them, link prediction is a more challenging task and widely used in real-world, which aims to
predict the connection strength of an edge, e.g., predicting the potential relationship between two
specied persons in a social network, and even the new or dissolution relationship in the future.
Link prediction tasks take the same input as node classication tasks, while the output is binary
which indicates an edge will exist or not. erefore the objective function of link prediction tasks
could be similarly dened as Eq.(1) by changing yi ∈ {0, 1}, and replacingVL with a set of labeled
edges EL .
Graph-level Task. While treating the graph as a special form of node, the graph-level tasks are
similar to node-level tasks. Take the most frequent application, graph classication, as an example,
the graph G could be represented as G = {G1,G2, . . . ,Gn}, whereGi = (Vi , Ei ) is a subgraph of the
entire graph. e core idea to solve the graph classication problem is to learn a mapping function
G → C, here C represents the set of graph categories, so as to predict the class for an unseen graph
more accurately. e objective function of graph classication tasks is similar with Eq.(1) as well,
in which the labeled training set is GL instead ofVL , and yi is the category of the graph Gi . In real
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world, graph classication task plays an important role in many crucial applications, such as social
and biological graph classication.
3 ADVERSARIAL ATTACK
In this section, we will rst introduce the denition of adversarial aack against deep learning
methods on graphs. en, we categorize these aack models from dierent perspectives. Finally,
we will give a clear overview on existing works.
3.1 Definition
According to existing works on graph adversarial aacks, we summarize and give a unied formu-
lation for them.
Aack on Graph Data. Considering f a deep learning function designed to tackle related down-
stream tasks. Given a set of target instances T ⊆ S −SL , where S could beV , E or G respectively
for dierent levels of tasks, and SL denotes the instances with labels,1 the aacker aims to maximize
the loss of the target node on f as much as possible, resulting in the degradation of prediction
performance. Generally, we can dene the aack against deep learning models on graphs as:
maximize
Gˆ ∈Ψ(G)
∑
ti ∈T
L(fθ ∗ (Gˆti ,X , ti ),yi )
s .t . θ ∗ = arg min
θ
∑
vj ∈SL
L(fθ (G˜vj ,X , tj )),yj )
(2)
We denote a graph G ∈ G with node ti in it as Gti . Gˆ denotes the perturbed graph and Ψ(G)
indicates the perturbation space on G, and we use G˜ to represent original graph G or a modied
one Gˆ, respectively.
To make the aack as imperceptible as possible, we set a metric for comparison between the
graphs before and aer the aack, such that:
Q(Gˆti ,Gti ) < ϵ
s .t . Gˆti ∈ Ψ(G) (3)
where Q denotes a similarity function, and ϵ is an allowed threshold of changes. Specically, more
metrics will be detailed in Section 5.
3.2 Taxonomies of Aacks
As we focus on a simple graph, dierent types of aacks could be conducted on the target systems.
In this section, we provide taxonomies for the aack types mainly proposed by Sun et al. [57] and
subsequently extended in our works according to various criteria. For dierent scenarios, we give
relevant instructions and summarize them in the following:
3.2.1 Aackers Knowledge. To conduct aacks on the target system, usually an aacker will
possess certain knowledge about the target models and the dataset, which helps them achieve
the adversarial goal. Based on the knowledge of the target models [57], we characterize dierent
threatening levels of aacks.
1Note that aackers only focus on aacking the target instances in the test set.
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White-box Aack. is is the simplest aacks while aackers possess the entire information
of the target models, including the model architecture, parameters and gradient information, i.e.,
the target models are fully exposed to the aackers. By utilizing such rich information, aackers
can easily aect the target models and bring destructive eects. However, it is impracticable in real
world since it is costly to possess such complete knowledge of target models. erefore white-box
aack is less dangerous but oen used to approximate the worst performance of a system under
aack.
Gray-box Aack. In this case, aackers are strict to possess excessive knowledge about the
target models, this reects real world scenarios much beer since it is more likely that aackers
have limited access to get the information, e.g., only familiar with the architecture of the target
models. erefore, it’s harder than conducting the white-box aack but more dangerous for the
target models.
Black-box Aack. In contrast to white-box aack, black-box aack assumes that the aacker
does not know anything about the targeted systems. Under this seing, aackers are only allowed
to do black-box queries on limited samples at most. However, it will be the most dangerous aack
once it works, since aackers can aack any models with limited (or no) information.
Here also comes a term “no-box attack” [55] which refers to an aack on the surrogate model
based on their (limited) understanding of the target model.2 As aackers have complete knowledge
of the surrogate model, the adversarial examples are generated under white-box seing. No-box
aack will become a white-box aack once the aackers build a surrogate model successfully
and the adversarial examples are transferable to fool other target models. eoretically, this kind
of aack can hardly aect the systems in most cases with these constraints. However, as if the
surrogate model has strong transferability, the no-box aack is also destructive.
As aackers are strict with the knowledge of the target models, they also have less access to the
information of the dataset D. Based on the dierent levels of knowledge of the targeted system
[17], we have:
Perfect Knowledge. In this case, the dataset D, including the entire graph structure, node
features, and even the ground-truth labels of objects, are completely exposed to aackers, i.e., the
aacker is assumed to know everything about the dataset. is is impractical but the most common
seing in previous studies. However, considering the damage that could be done by an aacker
with perfect knowledge is critical, since it may expose the potential weaknesses of the target system
in a graph.
Moderate Knowledge. e moderate knowledge case represents an aacker with less informa-
tion about the dataset. is makes aackers focus more on the performance of their aacks, or
even search for more information through legitimate or illegitimate methods.
Minimal Knowledge. is is the hardest one as aackers can only conduct aacks with the
minimal knowledge of datasets, such as partial connections of the graph or the feature information
of certain nodes. is is essential information for an aacker, otherwise it will fail even under the
white-box aack seing. e minimal knowledge case represents the least sophisticated aacker
and naturally with less threat level.
To conclude, we use K to denote the aackers’ knowledge in an abstract knowledge space.
Here K is consisting of three main parts, the dataset knowledge, the training algorithm and the
learned parameters of target models. For instance, K = (D, f ,θ ) denotes white-box aack with
2We must realize that no-box is a kind of gray- or black-box aack so we don’t don’t have a separate category for it.
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Fig. 2. An example of the evasion aack and the poisoning aack. (Image Credit: Zu¨nger et al. [85])
perfect knowledge, and K = (Dtrain , fˆ , θˆ ) denotes gray- or black-box aack and with moderate
knowledge, where fˆ and θˆ come from the surrogate model and Dtrain ⊂ D denotes the training
dataset.
3.2.2 Aacker’s Goal. e goal generally distinguishes three dierent types of aacks, i.e.,
security violation, aack specicity and error specicity [1]. ey are not mutually exclusive in fact,
and more details are discussed below.
Security Violation. Security violation can be categorized into availability aack, integrity
aack and others. For availability aack, the the aacker aempts to destroy the function of the
system, thereby impairing its normal operation. e damage is global, that is, it aacks the overall
performance of the whole system. For integrity aack, the aackers’ purpose is to bypass or fool
the detection of the system, which is dierent from availability aack in that it does not destroy
the normal operation of the system. ere are other goals, such as reverse-engineering model
information to gain privacy knowledge.
Error Specicity. Take node classication task as an example, the error specic aack aims
to misclassify the predictions as specic labels, while unspecic aack does not care what the
prediction is, the aack is considered successful as long as the prediction is wrong.
Aack Specicity. is perspective focuses on the range of the aack, which can divide aacks
into targeted aack and non-targeted aack (general aack). e targeted aack focuses on a specic
subset of nodes (usually a target node), while the non-targeted aack is undierentiated and global.
With reference to Eq.(2), the dierence is the domain of T ⊂ S − SL or T = S − SL .
It is worth noting that in some other elds (e.g., computer vision), targeted aack refers to the
specic error aack, and non-targeted aack the unspecic error aack. In the eld of graph
adversarial learning, we suggest that distinguishing the targeted aack based on the aack range,
and whether it is error specic based on the consequence.
3.2.3 Aacker’s Capability. Aacks can be divided into poisoning aack and evasion aack
according to adversaries’ capabilities, which are occurred at dierent stages of the aacks.
Poisoning Aack. Poisoning aacks (a.k.a training-time aacks) try to aect the performance
of the target models by modifying the dataset in the training stage, i.e., the target models are trained
on the poisoned datasets. Since transductive learning is widely used in most graph analysis tasks,
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the test samples (but not their labels) are participated in the training stage, which leads to the
popularity of poisoning aacks. Under this scenario, the parameters of target models are retrained
aer the training dataset being modied, thus we can dene poisoning aacks according to Eq.(2):
maximize
Gˆ ∈Ψ(G)
∑
ti ∈T
L(fθ ∗ (Gˆti ,X , ti ),yi )
s .t . θ ∗ = arg min
θ
∑
vj ∈SL
L(fθ (Gˆvj ,X ,vj ),yj )
(4)
Evasion Aack. While poisoning aacks focus on the training phase, evasion aacks (a.k.a
test-time aacks) tend to add adversarial examples in test time. Evasion aacks occur aer the
target model is well trained on a clean graph, i.e., the learned parameters are xed during evasion
aacks. erefore, we can dene the formulation of evasion aacks by changing part of Eq.(4)
slightly:
θ ∗ = arg min
θ
∑
vj ∈SL
L(fθ (Gvj ,X ,vj ),yj ) (5)
In Figure 2, we show a toy example of the poisoning aack and the evasion aack. In most cases
the poisoning aack does not work well because the model is retrained to alleviate the adversarial
impacts.
3.2.4 Aack Strategy. For aacking a target model on graph data, aackers may have a line
of strategies to achieve their adversarial goals. In most instances, they will focus on the graph
structure or node/edge features. Based on the strategy applied on a graph, we have:
Topology Aack. Aackers are mainly focus on the the topology of the graph, a.k.a, structure
aack. For example, they are allowed to add or remove some edges legally between nodes in
the graph to fool the target system. To specify this, we dene an aack budget ∆ ∈ N, thus the
denition of the topology aack is:
maximize
Gˆ ∈Ψ(G)
∑
ti ∈T
L(fθ ∗ (Gˆti ,X , ti ),yi )
s .t .
∑
u<v
|Au,v −A′u,v | ≤ ∆
(6)
where A′ is the adjacency matrix of the perturbed graph, and θ ∗ is discussed in Section 3.2.3.
Feature Aack. Although the topology aack is more common, aackers can conduct feature
aacks as well. Under this seing, the features of specied objects will be changed. However, unlike
graph structure, the node/edge features could be either binary or continuous, i.e., X ∈ {0, 1}N×F(·)
orX ∈ RN×F(·) . For binary features, aackers can ip them like edges, while for continuous features,
aackers can add a small value on them, respectively. us the denition of feature aacks is:
maximize
Gˆ ∈Ψ(G)
∑
ti ∈T
L(fθ ∗ (Gˆti ,X , ti ),yi )
s .t .
∑
u
∑
j
|Xu, j − X ′u, j | ≤ ∆
(7)
whereX ′ is similarly dened, and here ∆ ∈ N for binary features and ∆ ∈ R for continuous features.
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Hybrid. Usually, aackers will conduct both aack strategies at the same time to exert more
powerful impact. Besides, they could even add several fake nodes (with fake labels), which will
have their own features and relationship with other benign instances. For example, some fake
users will be added into the recommendation system and aect the results of the system [16, 29].
erefore, we conclude a unied formulation as follows:
maximize
Gˆ ∈Ψ(G)
∑
ti ∈T
L(fθ ∗ (Gˆti ,X , ti ),yi )
s .t .
∑
u<v
|Au,v −A′u,v | +
∑
u
∑
j
|Xu, j − X ′u, j | ≤ ∆
(8)
A′ and X ′ may not have the same dimension with A and X respectively if some fake nodes are
added into the graph.
3.2.5 Aackers Manipulation. Although aackers may have enough knowledge about the
target system, they may not always have access to manipulation all of the dataset. Besides, dierent
manipulations may have dierent budget cost. For example, in an e-commerce system [14], aackers
could only purchase more items (add edges) but unable to delete the purchase records (remove
edges). Based on dierent manipulation, we have:
Add. In a graph, aackers could add edges between dierent nodes, or add features on specied
nodes/edges. is is the most simplest manipulation and naturally has lowest budget in most
scenarios.
Remove. In a graph, aackers could remove edges between dierent nodes, or remove features
on specied nodes/edges. is kind of manipulation will be harder than “add”, since aackers may
not have enough access to execute the “remove” manipulation.
Rewiring. e manipulations mentioned above may become more noticeable for the target
system if ∆ is larger. To address this problem, the rewiring operation is proposed in a less noticeable
way than simple adding/removing manipulation [39, 70]. For instance, aackers can add an edge
connected with a target node, while remove an edge connected with it at the same time. Each time
of rewiring manipulation related to two single operations, which can preserve some basic graph
properties (e.g., degree) and naturally more unnoticeable.
To conclude, we dene an operation set O = {OAdd ,ORem ,ORew }, representing the above three
manipulations of aackers, respectively.
3.2.6 Aack Algorithm. Generally speaking, current methods of adversarial aacks on gener-
ating adversarial examples are mainly based on the gradient information, either from the target
model (white-box aack) or the surrogate model (black- or gray-box aack). Beyond that, there are
several methods generating adversarial examples based on other algorithms. From the perspective
of aack algorithm, we have:
Gradient-based Algorithm. Intuitively, gradient-based algorithm is simple but eective. e
core idea is that: x the parameters of a trained model, and regard the input as a hyperparameter to
optimize. Similar to the training process, aackers could use the partial derivative of loss L with
respect to edges (topology aack) or features (feature aack), to decide how to manipulate the
dataset. However, gradients could not applied directly into the input data due to the discreteness
of the graph data, instead, aackers oen choose the one with greatest absolute gradients, and
manipulate it with a proper value. While most deep learning models are optimized by gradients,
on the contrary, aackers could destroy them by gradients as well.
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Non-gradient-based Algorithm. In addition to gradient information, aackers could generate
adversarial examples in other ways. For example, from the perspective of the genetic algorithm,
aackers can choose the population (adversarial examples) with highest tness score (e.g., erroneous
outputs of the target/surrogate model) generations by generations. Besides, reinforcement learning
algorithms are also commonly used to solve this issue. Reinforcement learning based aack
methods [20, 39] will learn the generalizable adversarial examples within an action space. Moreover,
adversarial examples can even generated by a well-designed generative model.
3.2.7 Target Task. As discussed in Section 2.3, there exists three major tasks in graph domains.
According to dierent levels of tasks, we can divide existing aack methods into the following
three categories, respectively.
Node-relevant Task. Currently, there are several aack models against node-relevant tasks
[2, 4, 10, 12, 20, 20, 58, 65, 68, 70, 72, 75, 77, 82, 85, 86]. Typically, Bojchevski et al. and Hou et al.
[2, 29] utilize random walk [49] as an surrogate model to aack node embedding, Dai et al. [20]
uses a reinforcement learning based framework to disturb node classication tasks. In general,
most of the existing works address in node classication task due to its ubiquity in real world.
Link-relevant Task. Many relationships in real world can be represented by graph. For some
of these graphs, such as social graph, are always dynamic in reality. erefore, the link prediction
on the graph comes into being, in order to predict the change of the edge. Link prediction is also
the most common application of link-relevant tasks and there are many aack related studies have
been proposed [10, 13, 16, 18, 58, 70, 82, 82].
Graph-relevant Task. Graph-relevant tasks treat graph as a basic unit. Compared to node- or
link-relevant tasks, it is macro and large-scale. e application of graph-relevant methods are more
inclined to the research community of biology, chemistry, environment, materials, etc. In this task,
the model tries to extract features of nodes and spatial structures to represent a graph, so as to
achieve downstream operations such as graph classication or clustering. Similar with Eq.(2), the
targets of aack should be an graphs, while y is determined by the specic task. For graph-relevant
tasks, some aack researches have also appeared [8, 17, 39].
3.3 Summary: Aack on Graph
In this part, we will discuss the main contributions of current works, and point out the limitations to
be overcome, and propose several open questions in this area. Specically, we cover these released
papers and its characteristic in Table 2.
3.3.1 Major Contributions. So far, most of the existing works in the aack scenario are mainly
based on the gradients, either the adjacency matrix or feature matrix, leading to topology aack
and feature aack, respectively. However, the gradients’ information of the target model is hard
to acquire, instead, aackers will train a surrogate model to extract the gradients. In addition to
gradient-based algorithms, several heuristic methods are proposed to achieve the goal of aack,
such as genetic algorithm [71] and reinforcement learning [60] based algorithms. According to
dierent tasks in graph analysis, we summarize the major contributions of current works in the
following.
Node-relevant Task. Most of the researches focus on the node classication task. e work [85]
is the rst to study the adversarial aack on graph data, using an ecient greedy search method to
perform perturbations on node features and graph structure and aacking traditional graph learning
model. From the perspective of gradients, there are several works [12, 20, 68, 72, 75, 86] focus on
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Table 2. Related works on aack in details.
Reference Model Algorithm Target Task Target Model Baseline Metric Dataset
[6] GF-Aack Graph signal processing Node classication GCN, SGC,DeepWalk, LINE
Random,
Degree,
RL-S2V,
Aclass
Accuracy
Cora,
Citeseer,
Pubmed
[72] IG-FGSM,IG-JSMA Gradient-based GCN Node classication GCN
FGSM,
JSMA,
Neack
Classication margin,
Accuracy
Cora,
Citeseer,
PolBlogs
[9] EPA Genetic algorithm Community detection GRE, INF,LOU
AQ , AS , AB ,
AD , DS , DW
NMI,
ARI
Synthetic networks,
Football, Email,
Polblogs
[86] Meta-Self,Meta-Train Gradient-Based GCN Node classication
GCN,
CLN,
Deepwalk
DICE,
Neack,
First-order
Misclassication rate,
Accuracy
Cora-ML,
Citeseer,
PolBlogs,
PubMed,
[2] ADW 2,ADW 3 Gradient-based random walk
Node classication,
Link prediction Deepwalk
Brnd
Beiд
Bdeд
F1 score,
Classication margin
Cora,
Citeseer,
PolBlogs
[13] TGA-Tra,TGA-Gre Gradient-based DDNE Link prediction
DDNE,
ctRBM,
GTRBM,
dynAERNN
Random,
DGA,
CNA
ASR, AML
RADOSLAW,
LKML,
FB-WOSN
[39] ReWa Reinforcement learningbased on GCN
Graph
classication GCN
RL-S2V,
Random ASR
REDDIT-
MULTI-12K,
REDDIT-MULTI-5K,
IMDB-MULTI
[75] PGD,Min-Max Gradient-based GCN Node classication GCN
DICE,
Meta-Self,
Greedy
Misclassication
rate
Cora,
Citeseer
[77] EDA Genetic algorithmbased on Deepwalk
Node classication,
Community detection
HOPE,
LPA,
EM,
Deepwalk
Random,
DICE,
RLS,
DBA
NMI,
Micro-F1,
Macro-F1
Karate,
Game,
Dolphin
[4] DAGAER Generative model basedon VGAE Node classication GCN Neack ASR
Cora,
Citeseer
[79] - Knowledge embedding Fact plausibilityprediction
TransE,
TransR,
RESCAL
Random MRR, HR@K FB15k,WN18
[65] - Based on LinLBP Node classication,Evasion
LinLBP, JW, GCN
LBP, RW, LINE
DeepWalk
Node2vec
Random,
Neack
FNR,
FPR
Facebook, Enron,
Epinions,
Twier,
Google+
[8] Q-Aack Genetic algorithm Community detection
FN, Lou, SOA,
LPA, INF,
Node2vec+KM
Random,
CDA,
DBA
NMI,
Modularity Q
Karate,
Dolphins,
Football,
Polbooks,
[29] HG-aack Label propagation algorithm,Nodes injection Malware detection Orig-HGC AN-Aack
TP, TN, FP, FN, F1,
Precision, Recall, Accuracy
Tencent Security
Lab Dataset
[16] UNAack Gradient-based similarity method,Nodes injection Recommendation
Memory-based CF,
BPRMF, NCF
Random,
Average,
Popular,
Co-visitation
Hit@K
Filmtrust,
Movielens,
Amazon
[18] - Gradient-based GAN and MF,Nodes injection Recommendation MF -
Aack dierence,
TVD, JS, Est.,
Rank loss @K,
Adversarial loss
MovieLens 100k,
MovieLens 1M
[68] Greedy GAN Gradient-based GCN and GAN Nodeclassication GCN Random
Accuracy,
F1 score, ASR
Cora,
Citeseer
[70] CTR, OTC Neighbor score basedon graph structure Link prediction
Traditional
link prediction
algorithms
- AUC, AP
WTC 9/11,
ScaleFree,
Facebook,
Random network
[10] IGA Gradient-based GAE Link prediction
GAE,LRW
DeepWalk,
Node2vec,
CN, Random, Katz
RAN,
DICE,
GA
ASR,
AML
NS,
Yeast,
FaceBook
[20] RL-S2V Reinforcement learning Node/GraphClassication
GCN,
GNN
Random
sampling Accuracy
Citeseer, Cora,
Finance,
Pubmed
[85] Neack Greedy search & gradientbased on GCN Node classication
GCN,
CLN,
Deepwalk
Rnd,
FGSM
Classication margin,
Accuracy,
Cora-ML,
Citeseer,
PolBlogs
[12] FGA Gradient-based GCN Node classication,Community detection
GCN, GraRep,
DeepWalk,
Node2vec,
LINE, GraphGAN
Random,
DICE,
Neack
ASR, AML
Cora,
Citeseer,
PolBlogs,
[58] Opt-aack Gradient-based Deepwalk and Link prediction
DeepWalk,
LINE, SC
Node2vec, GAE
Random,
PageRank,
Degree sum,
Shortest path
AP,
Similarity Score
Facebook,
Cora,
Citeseer
[82] Approx-Local Similarity methods Link prediction
Local& global
similarity
metrics
RandomDel,
GreedyBase
Katz similarity,
ACT distance,
Similarity score
Random network,
Facebook
[17] Targeted noise injection,Small community aack Noise injection
Graph clustering,
Community detection
SVD, Node2vec,
Community
detection algorithms
- ASR, FPR
Reverse,
Engineered,
DGA,
Domains,
NXDOMAIN
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the topology aack, adding/removing edges between nodes based on the gradients information
form various surrogate models. Specially, Xu et al. [75] present a novel optimized-based aack
method that uses the gradients of surrogate model and facilitates the diculty of tackling discrete
graph data; Zu¨gner et al. [86] use meta-gradients to solve the bilevel problem of poisoning a graph;
Wang et al. [68] propose a greedy method based on Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) [25]
to generate adjacency and feature matrices of fake nodes, which will be injected to a graph to
misclassify the target models; Chen et al. and Dai et al. [12, 20] both use GCN as a surrogate
model to extract gradients information and thus generating an adversarial graph; Wu et al. [72]
argue that integrated gradients can beer reect the eect of perturbing certain features or edges.
Moreover, Dai et al. [20] consider evasion aacks on the task of node classication and graph
classication, and proposes two eective aack methods based on the reinforcement learning
and genetic algorithms, respectively. Taking Deepwalk [49] as a base method, Bojchevski et al.
[2] and Xuan et al. [77] propose a eigen decomposition and genetic algorithm based strategy to
aack the network embedding, respectively. Also, Bose et al. [4] design a unied encoder-decoder
framework from the generative perspective, which can be employed to aack diverse domains
(images, text and graphs), Wang et al. [65] propose a threat model to manipulate the graph structure
to evade detection by solving a graph-based optimization problem eciently. Considering real-
world application scenarios, Hou et al. [29] propose an algorithm that allows malware to evade
detection by injecting nodes (apps).
Link-relevant Task. Link prediction is another fundamental research problems in network
analysis. In this scenario, Waniek et al. [70] study the link connections, and propose heuristic
algorithms to evade the detection by rewiring operations. Furthermore, Chen et al. [10] put forward
a novel iterative gradient aack method based on a graph auto-encoder framework. Similarly, Chen
et al. [13] also exploit the gradients information of surrogate model, and rstly study the works
about adversarial aacks on dynamic network link prediction (DNLP). Besides, Sun et al. [58] focus
on poisoning aacks and propose a unied optimization framework based on projected gradient
descent. In the recommendation scenario, considering the interactions between users and items
as a graph and treat it as a link prediction task, Christakopoulou et al. [18] and Chen et al. [16]
propose the method of injecting fake users to degrade the recommendation performance of the
system.
Graph-relevant Task. Few works study the adversarial aacks on this scenario, Ma et al. [39]
propose a rewiring operation based algorithm, which uses reinforcement learning to learn the
aack strategy on the task of graph classication. Besides, Chen et al. [8] introduce the problem of
community detection and proposes a genetic algorithm based method. Chen et al. [17] focus on
graph clustering and community detection scenarios, devise generic aack algorithms based on
noise injection and demonstrates their eectiveness against a real-world system.
3.3.2 Current Limitations. Despite the remarkable achievements on aacking graph learning
models, there are several limitations remain to be overcome:
• Unnoticeability. Most works are unaware of preserving the adversarial aacks from
noticeable impacts, they simply consider the lower aack budgets but far from enough
instead.
• Scalability. Existing works are mainly focus on a relatively small-scale graph, however,
million-scale or even larger graphs are commonly seen in real life, and ecient aacks on
larger graph are leaving unexplored.3
3ere has been some eorts on large-scale graph computation that would be useful for graph learning methods. [78, 84]
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• Knowledge. It is common to assume that aackers have perfect knowledge about the dataset,
but it is unreasonable and impractical due to the limited access of aackers. Nevertheless,
very few works conduct aacks with moderate or even minimal knowledge.
• Physical Attack. Most of the existing works conduct aacks on ideal datasets. However,
in real world, aacks need to consider more factors. For instance, in a physical aack the
adversarial examples as input will be distorted accidentally and it oen fails to achieve the
desired results. Unlike conducting aacks on ideal datasets, this brings more challenges to
aackers.
4 DEFENSE
e proposed aack methods have made researchers realize the importance of the robustness of
deep learning models. Relatively, some defense methods have also been proposed. In this section,
we will give some general denitions of defense models against adversarial aack methods on graph
data and its related concepts. In addition, this section systematically classies existing defense
methods and details some typical defense algorithms.
4.1 Definition
Simply put, the purpose of defense is to make the performance of the model still maintain a certain
stability on the data that is maliciously disturbed. Although some defense models have been
proposed, there is no clear and unied denition of the defense problem. To facilitate the discussion
of the following, we propose a unied formulation of the defense problem.
Defense on Graph Data. Most symbols are the same as mentioned in Section 3, and we dene f˜
as a deep learning function with the loss function L˜ designed for defense, it receives a graph either
perturbed or not. en the defense problem can be dened as:
minimize
Gˆ ∈Ψ(G)∪G
∑
ti ∈T
L˜( f˜θ ∗ (Gˆti ,X , ti ),yi )
s .t . θ ∗ = arg min
θ
∑
vj ∈SL
L˜( f˜θ (G˜vj ,X ,vj ),yj )
(9)
where G˜ ∈ Ψ(G)∪G can be a well-designed graph Gˆ for the purpose of defense, or a clean graph
G, which depends on whether the model have been aacked.
4.2 Taxonomies of Defenses
In this section, we divide the existing defense methods into several categories according to the
used algorithms and describe them by examples. To the best of our knowledge, it’s the rst time
for those defense methods to be clearly classied and the rst time for those types to be clearly
dened. All taxonomies are listed below:
Preprocessing-based Defense. As the most intuitive way, directly manipulating the raw data
has a great impact on the model performance. Additionally, preprocessing raw data is independent
to model structures and training methods, which gives considerable scalability and transferability.
Some existing works[72] improve model robustness by conducting certain preprocessing steps
before training, and we dene this type of defense methods as Preprocessing-based Defense. In
addition, Wu et al. [72] try to drop edges that connect nodes with low similarity score, which could
reduce the risk for those edges of being aack and nearly does no harm to the model performance.
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Structure-based Defense. In addition to raw data, model structure is also crucial to the model
performance. Some existing works modify the model structure, such as GCN, to gain more ro-
bustness, and we dene this type of defense methods as Structure-based Defense. Instead of GCN’s
graph convolutional layers, Zhu et al. [83] use Gaussian-based graph convolutional layers, which
learns node embeddings from Gaussian distributions and assign aention weight according to
their variances. Wang et al. [67] propose dual-stage aggregation as a Graph Neural Network
(GNN) encoder layer to learn the information of neighborhoods, and adopt GAN [25] to conduct
contrastive learning. Tang et al. [62] initialize the model by meta-optimization and penalize the
aggregation process of GNN. And Ioannidis et al. [32] propose a novel GCN architecture, named
Adaptive Graph Convolutional Network (AGCN), to conduct robust semi-supervised learning.
Adversarial-based Defense. Adversarial training has been widely used in deep learning due
to its excellent performance. Some researchers successfully adopt adversarial training from other
elds into graph domain to improve model robustness, and we dene the defense methods which
use adversarial training as Adversarial-based Defense. ere are two types of adversarial training: i)
Training with adversarial goals. Some adversarial training methods gradually optimize the model in
a continuous min-max way, under the guide of two opposite (minimize and maximize) objective
functions [24, 56, 75]; ii) Training with adversarial examples. Other adversarial-based models are
fed with adversarial samples during training, which helps the model learn to adjust to adversarial
samples and thus reduces the negative impacts of those potential aack samples [11, 22, 28, 69].
Objective-based Defense. As a simple and eective method, modifying objective function plays
an important role in improving the model robustness. Many existing works aempt to train a
robust model against adversarial aacks by optimizing the objective function, and we dene this
type of defense methods as Objective-based Defense. However, there is a lile intersection between
the denition of Objective-based Defense and Adversarial-based Defense mentioned above, because
the min-max adversarial training (the rst type of Adversarial-based Defense) is also in the range
of objective optimization. erefore, to accurately distinguish the denition boundary between
Adversarial-based Defense and Objective-based Defense, we only consider those methods which are
objective-based but not adversarial-based as the instances of Objective-based Defense. Zu¨gner et
al. [87] and Bojchevski et al. [3] combine hinge loss and cross entropy loss to perform a robust
optimization. Jin et al. [33] and Chen et al. [11] regularize the training process by studying the
characteristics of graph powering and smoothing the cross-entropy loss function, respectively.
Detection-based Defense. Some existing works focus on the detection of adversarial aacks, or
the certication of model/node robustness, which we dene as Detection-based Defense. Although
those detection-based methods are unable to improve the model robustness directly, they can
serve as supervisors who keep monitoring the model security and alarm for awareness when an
aack is detected. Zu¨gner et al. [87] and Bojchevski et al. [3] propose novel methods to certicate
whether a node is robust, and a robust node means it won’t be aected even under the worse-
case/strongest aack. Pezeshkpour et al. [50] study the impacts of adding/removing edges by
performing adversarial modications on the graph. Xu et al. [76] adopt link prediction and its
variants to detect the potential risks, and for example, link with low score could be a maliciously
added edge. Zhang et al. [80] utilize perturbations to explore the model structure and propose
a method to detect adversarial aack. Hou et al. [29] detect the target node by uncovering the
poisoning nodes injected in the heterogeneous graph [59]. Ioannidis et al. [31] eectively detect
anomalous nodes in large-scale graphs by applying a graph-based random sampling and consensus
strategies.
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Hybrid Defense. As the name suggested, we dene Hybrid Defense to denote the defense method
which consists of two or more types of dierent defense algorithms mentioned above. Many
researches exibly combine several types of defense algorithms to achieve beer performance,
thus alleviate the limitations of only using a single method. As mentioned above, Zu¨gner et al.
[87] and Bojchevski et al. [3] address the certication problem of node robustness and conduct
robust training with objective-based optimization. Wang et al. [67] focus on improving the model
structure and adversarially train the model by GAN. Chen et al. [11] adopt adversarial training
and other regularization mechanisms (e.g., gradient smoothing, loss smoothing). Xu et al. [76]
propose a novel graph generation method together with other detection mechanisms (e.g., link
prediction, subgraph sampling, outlier detect) as preprocessing to detect potential malicious edges.
Miller et al. [43] consider a combination of the features come from graph structure and origin node
aributes and use well-designed training data selection methods to do a classication task. ese
are instances of the hybrid defense.
Others. Currently, the amount of researches for defense is far less than that of aack on the
graph domain. To the best of our knowledge, most existing works for defense only focus on node
classication tasks, and there are a lot of opportunities to study defense methods with dierent
tasks on graph, which will enrich our defense types. For example, Pezeshkpour et al. [50] evaluate
the robustness of several link prediction models and Zhou et al. [81] adopt the heuristic approach
to reduce the damage of aacks.
4.3 Summary: Defense on Graph
In this section, we will introduce the contributions and limitations of current works about defense.
en, we will discuss the potential research opportunities in this area. e details and comparisons
of various methods are placed in Table 3.
4.3.1 Major Contributions. Currently, most of the methods to improve the robustness of GNNs
start from two aspects: a robust training method or a robust model structure. Among them, the
training methods are mostly adversarial training, and many of the model structure improvements
are made using the aention mechanism. In addition, there are some studies that do not directly
improve the robustness of GNNs but try to verify the robustness or try to detect the data that is
disturbed. In this part, considering the dierent ways in which existing methods contribute to the
adversarial defense of graphs, we summarize the contributions of graph defense from the following
three perspectives: adversarial learning, model improvement and others.
Adversarial Learning. As a successful method that has shown to be eective in defending the
adversarial aacks of image data and test data, adversarial learning [26] augments the training
data with adversarial examples during the training stage. Some researchers have also tried to apply
this kind of idea to graph defense methods. Wang et al. [67] think the vulnerabilities of graph
neural networks are related to the aggregation layer and the perceptron layer. To address these
two disadvantages, they propose an adversarial training framework with a modied GNN model
to improve the robustness of GNNs. Chen et al. [11] propose dierent defense strategies based
on adversarial training for target and global adversarial aack with smoothing distillation and
smoothing cross-entropy loss function. Feng et al. [24] propose a method of adversarial training
for the aack on node features with a graph adversarial regularizer which encourages the model to
generate similar predictions on the perturbed target node and its connected nodes. Sun et al. [56]
successfully transfer the eciency of Virtual Adversarial Training (VAT) to the semi-supervised
node classication task on graphs and applies some regularization mechanisms on original GCN to
rene its generalization performance. Wang et al. [69] point out that the values of perturbation
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Table 3. Related works on defense in details. The type is divided according to the algorithm.
Reference Model Algorithm Type Target Task Target Model Baseline Metric Dataset
[87] GNN (trained withRH-U)
Robustness certication,
Objective based Hybrid
Node
classication
GNN,
GCN
GNN
(trained with
CE, RCE, RH)
Accuracy,
Averaged
Worst-case
Margin
Citeseer,
Cora-ML,
Pubmed
[75] - Adversarial training Adversarialtraining
Node
classication GCN GCN
Accuracy,
Misclassication rate
Citeseer,
Cora
[33] r-GCN,VPN
Graph
powering
Objective
based
Node
classication GCN
ManiReg,
ICA,
Vanilla GCN,
…
Accuracy, Robustness merit,
Aack deterioration
Citeseer,
Cora,
Pubmed
[72] - Drop edges Preprocessing Nodeclassication GCN GCN
Accuracy,
Classication margin
Citeseer,
Cora-ML,
Polblogs
[67] DefNet
GAN,
GER,
ACL
Hybrid Nodeclassication
GCN,
GraphSAGE
GCN,
GraphSAGE
Classication
margin
Citeseer,
Cora,
Polblogs
[50] CRIAGE Adversarialmodication
Robustness
evaluation
Link
prediction
Knowledge
graph
embeddings
- Hits@K,MRR
Nations,
Kinship,
WN18,
YAGO3-10
[83] RGCN Gaussian-basedGCN
Structure
based
Node
classication GCN
GCN,
GAT Accuracy
Citeseer,
Cora,
Pubmed
[11]
Global-AT,
Target-AT,
SD, SCEL
Adversarial
training,
Smooth defense
Hybrid Nodeclassication GNN AT
ADR,
ACD
Citeseer,
Cora,
PolBlogs
[56] SVAT,DVAT VAT
Adversarial
training
Node
classication GCN GCN Accuracy
Citeseer,
Cora,
Pubmed
[80] - KLdivergence
Detection
based
Node
classication
GCN,
GAT -
Classication margin,
Accuracy, ROC, AUC
Citeseer,
Cora,
PolBlogs
[24] GCN-GATV GAT,VAT
Adversarial
training
Node
classication GCN
DeepWalk,
GCN,
GraphSGAN,
…
Accuracy
Citeseer,
Cora,
NELL
[22] S-BVAT,O-BVAT BVAT
Adversarial
training
Node
classication GCN
ManiReg,
GAT,
GPNN,
GCN,
VAT,
…
Accuracy
Citeseer,
Cora,
Pubmed,
NELL
[62] PA-GNN Penalized aggregation,Meta learning
Structure
based
Node
classication GNN
GCN,
GAT,
PreProcess,
RGCN,
VPN
Accuracy
Pubmed,
Reddit,
Yelp-Small,
Yelp-Large
[69] GraphDefense Adversarialtraining
Adversarial
training
Node/Graph
classication GCN
Drop edges,
Discrete AT Accuracy
Cora,
Citeseer,
Reddit
[29] HG-HGC HG-Defense Detectionbased Malware detection
Malware
detection
system
Other malware
detection systems Detection rate
Tencent Security
Lab Dataset
[32] AGCN Adaptive GCN withedge dithering
Structure
based
Node
classication GCN GCN Accuracy
Citeseer,
PolBlogs,
Cora, Pubmed
[31] GraphSAC Random sampling,Consensus
Detection
based
Anomaly
detection
Anomaly
model
GAE,
Degree,
Cut ratio,
…
AUC
Citeseer,
PolBlogs,
Cora, Pubmed
[3] GNN (train with
LRCE , LCEM )
Robustness certication,
Objective based Hybrid
Node
classication GNN GNN
Accuracy,
Worst-case
Margin
Cora-ML,
Citeseer,
Pubmed
[81] IDOpt,IDRank
Integer Program,
Edge Ranking
Heuristic
algorithm
Link
prediction
Similarity-based
link prediction
models
PPN DPR
PA,
PLD,
TVShow,
Gov
[43]
SVM with
a radial basis
function kernel
Augmented feature,
Edge selecting Hybrid
Node
classication SVM GCN
Classication
marigin
Cora,
Citeseer
[28] APR,AMF
MF-BPR
based AT
Adversarial
training Recommendation MF-BPR
ItemPop,
MF-BPR,
CDAE,
NeuMF,
IRGAN
HR,
NDCG
Yelp,
Pinterest,
Gowalla
[76]
SL, OD,
P+GGD,
ENS,GGD
Link prediction,
Subsampling,
Neighbour analysis
Hybrid Nodeclassication GNN, GCN LP AUC
Citeseer,
Cora
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in adversarial training could be continuous or even negative. And they propose an adversarial
training method to improve the robustness of GCN. He et al. [28] adopt adversarial training to
Bayesian Personalized Ranking (BPR) [52] on recommendation by adding adversarial perturbations
on embedding vectors of the user and item.
Model Improvement. In addition to improvements in training methods, many studies have
focused on improving the model itself. In recent years, the aention mechanism [63] has shown
extraordinary performance in the eld of natural language processing. Some studies of graph
defense have borrowed the way that they can automatically give weight to dierent features to
reduce the inuence of perturbed edges on features. Zhu et al. [83] use Gaussian distributions to
absorb the eects of adversarial aacks and introduce a variance-based aention mechanism to
prevent the propagation of adversarial aacks. Tang et al. [62] propose a novel framework base on
a penalized aggregation mechanism which restrict the negative impact of adversarial edges. Hou et
al. [29] enhance the robustness of malware detection system in Android by their well-designed
defense mechanism to uncover the possible injected poisoning nodes. Jin et al. [33] point out the
basic aws of the Laplacian operator in origin GCN and propose a variable power operator to
alleviate the issues. Miller et al. [43] propose to use unsupervised methods to extract the features
of the graph structure and use support vector machines to complete the task of node classication.
In addition, they also propose two new training data partitioning strategies.
Others. In addition to improving the robustness of the model, there are also some studies that
have made other contributions around robustness, such as detecting disturbed edges, certicating
node robustness, analyses of current aack methods and so on. Zu¨gner et al. [87] propose the
rst work on certifying the robustness of GNNs. e method can give robustness certication
which states whether a node is robust under a certain space of perturbations. Zhang et al. [80]
study the defense methods’ performance under random aacks and Neack concluded that graph
defense models which use structure exploration are more robust in general. Otherwise, this paper
proposes a method to detect the perturbed edges by calculating the mean of the KL divergences [36]
between the somax probabilities of the node and it’s neighbors. Pezeshkpour et al. [50] introduce
a novel method to automatically detect the error for knowledge graphs by conducting adversarial
modications on knowledge graphs. In addition, the method can study the interpretability of
knowledge graph representations by summarizing the most inuential facts for each relation. Wu
et al. [72] argue that the robustness issue is rooted in the local aggregation in GCN by analyzing
aacks on GCN and propose an eective defense method based on preprocessing. Bojchevski et al.
[3] propose a robustness certicate method that can certicate the robustness of GNNs regarding
perturbations of the graph structure and the label propagation. In addition, they also propose a new
robust training method guided by their own certicate method. Zhou et al. [81] model the problem
of robust link prediction as a Bayesian Stackelberg game [64] and propose two defense strategies
to choose which link should be protected. Ioannidis et al. [32] propose a novel edge-dithering (ED)
approach reconstructs the original neighborhood structure with high probability as the number
of sampled graphs increases. Ioannidis et al. [31] introduce a graph-based random sampling and
consensus approach to eectively detect anomalous nodes in large-scale graphs.
4.3.2 Current Limitations. As a new-rising branch that has not been suciently studied, current
defense methods have several major limitations as follows:
• Diversity. At present, most works of defense mainly focus on node classication tasks
only. From the perspective of defender, they need to improve their model robustness on
dierent tasks.
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• Scalability. Whether a defense model can be widely used in practice largely depends on
the cost of model training. Most existing works lack the consideration of training costs.
• eoretical Proof. Most of current methods only illustrate their eectiveness by showing
experimental results and textual descriptions. It will be great if a new robust method’s
eectiveness can be proved theoretically.
5 METRICS
In this section, we rst introduce the metrics that are common in graph analysis tasks, which are
used in aack and defense scenarios as well. Next, we introduce some new metrics proposed in
aack and defense works from three perspectives: eectiveness, eciency, and imperceptibility.
5.1 Common Metrics
• FNR and FPR. In the classication or clustering tasks, here is a category of metrics based
on False Positive (FP), False Negative (FN ), True Positive (TP) and True Negative (TN ). In
aack and defense scenarios, commonly used to quantify are False Negative Rate (FNR)
and False Positive Rate (FPR). Specically, FNR is equal to FN over (TP + FN ), and FPR is
equal to FP over (FP + TN ). For all negative samples, the former describes the proportion of
false positive samples detected, while the laer describes the proportion of false negative
samples detected. In other words, for negative samples, the former is the error rate, and
the laer is the miss rate.
• Accuracy (Acc). e Accuracy is one of the most commonly used evaluation metrics,
which measures the quality of results based on the percentage of correct predictions over
total instances.
• F1-score. e F1 score [2] can be regarded as a harmonic average of model Precision and
Recall score [51], with a maximum value of 1 and a minimum value of 0.
• Area Under Curve (AUC). e AUC is the area under the Receiver Operating Character-
istic (ROC) curve [80]. Dierent models corresponding to dierent ROC curves, and it is
dicult to compare which one is beer if there is a crossover between the curves, thus
comparison based on the AUC score is more reasonable. In general, AUC indicates the
probability that the predicted positive examples rank in front of the negative examples.
• Average Precision (AP). As the area under the Precision-Recall curve, AP is described
as one of the most robust metrics [5]. Precision-Recall curve depicts the relationships
between Precision and Recall. A good model should improve the Recall while preserving
the Precision a relatively high score. In contrast, weaker models may lose more Precision
in order to improve Recall. Comparing with the Precision-Recall curve, AP can show the
performance of the model more intuitively.
• Mean Reciprocal Rank (MRR). e MRR is a commonly used metric to measure a rank
model. For a target query, if the rst correct item is ranked nth , then the MRR score is 1/n,
and once there is no match, the score is 0. e MRR of the model is the sum of the scores
of all queries.
• Hits@K. By calculating the rank (e.g., MRR) of all the ground-truth triples, Hits@K is the
proportion of correct entities ranked in top K.
• Modularity. e Modularity is an important measure based on the assortative mixing
[44], which usually used to assess the quality of dierent division for a particular network,
especially the community structure is unknown [45].
• NormalizedMutual Information (NMI).e NMI is another commonly used evaluation
to measure the quality of clustering results, so as to analyze the network community
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structure [21]. NMI further indicates the similarity between two partitions with mutual
information and information entropy, while a larger value means a higher similarity.
• Adjusted Rand Index (ARI). e ARI is a measure of the similarity between two data
clusterings: one given by the clustering process and the other dened by external criteria
[53]. Such a correction establishes a baseline by using the expected similarity of all pair-wise
comparisons between clusterings specied by a random model. ARI measures the relation
between pairs of dataset elements without labels’ information, which can cooperate with
conventional performance measures to detect classication algorithm. In addition, ARI can
also use labels information for feature selection [53].
5.2 Specific Metrics for Aack and Defense
In order to measure the performance, a number of specic metrics for aack and defense appear in
literature. Next, we will organize these metrics from three perspectives: eectiveness, eciency,
and imperceptibility.
5.2.1 Eectiveness-relevant Metrics. Both aack and defense require metrics to measure the
performance of the target model before and aer the aack. erefore, we have summarized some
metrics for measuring eectiveness and list them below:
• Attack Success Rate (ASR). ASR is the ratio of targets which will be successfully aacked
within a given xed budget [10]. Correspondingly, we can conclude the formulation of
ASR:
ASR = Number of successful aacksNumber of aacks (10)
• Classication Margin (CM). CM is only designed for the classication task. Under this
scenario, aackers aim to perturbe a graph that misclassies the target node and has
maximal “distance” (in terms of log-probabilities/logits) to the correct class [85]. Based on
this, CM is well formulated as:
CM = max
y′t,yt
Zt,y′t − Zt,yt (11)
where Zt is the output of the target model with respect to node t , and yt ∈ C is the correct
class label of vt while y ′t is the wrong one.
• Averaged Worst-case Margin (AWM). Worst-case Margin (WM) is the minimum of the
Classication Margin (CM) [87], and the average of WM is dynamically calculated over a
mini-batch of nodes during training. e Bs in the following equation denotes batch size.
AWM = 1
Bs
i=Bs∑
i=1
CMworsti (12)
• Robustness Merit (RM). It evaluates the robustness of the model by calculating the
dierence between the post-aack accuracy and pre-aack accuracy on GNNs [33]. And
Vaacked denotes the set of nodes theoretically aected by the aack.
RM = Accpost-aacked
V aacked
− Accpre-aacked
V aacked
(13)
• Attack Deterioration (AD). It evaluates the aack eect of the model prediction. Note
that any added/dropped edges can only aect the nodes within the spatial scope in the
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origin network [33], due to the spatial scope limitaions of the GNNs.
AD = 1 −
Accpost-aackedVaacked
Accpre-aackedVaacked
(14)
• Average Defense Rate (ADR). ADR is the ratio of the dierence between the ASR of
aack on GNNs with and without defense, versus the ASR of aack on GNNs without
defense [11]. e higher ADR the beer defense performance.
ADR =
ASRwith-defenseVaacked
ASRwithout-defenseVaacked
− 1 (15)
• Average Condence Dierent (ACD). ACD is the average condence dierent of nodes
in Ns before and aer aack [11], where Ns is the set of nodes which are classied correctly
before aack in test set. Note that Condence Dierent (CD) is equivalent to Classication
Margin (CM).
ACD = 1
Ns
∑
vi ∈Ns
CDi (Aˆvi ) − CDi (A) (16)
• Damage Prevention Ratio (DPR). Damage prevention is dened to measure the amount
of damage that can be prevented by defense [81]. Let L0 be the defender’s loss without
aack, LA be the defender’s loss under a certain aack strategy, A and LD be the defender’s
loss with a certain defense strategy D. A beer defense strategy leads to a larger DPR.
DPRDA =
LA − LD
LA − L0 (17)
5.2.2 Eiciency-relevant Metrics. Here we introduce some eciency metrics which measure the
cost of the aack and defense. For example, the metric of quantifying how much perturbations are
required for the same eect.
• AverageModied Links (AML). AML is designed for the topology aack, which indicates
the average perturbation size leading to a successful aack [10]. Assume that aackers
have limited budgets to aack a target model, the modied links (added or removed) are
accumulated until aackers achieve their goal or run out of the budgets. Based on this, we
can conclude the formulation of AML:
AML = Number of modied linksNumber of aacks (18)
5.2.3 Imperceptibility-relevant Metrics. Several metrics are proposed to measure the scale of the
manipulations caused by aack and defense, which are summarized as follows:
• Similarity Score. Generally speaking, Similarity Score is a measure to infer the likelihoods
of the existence of links, which usually applied in the link-level task [38, 82]. Specically,
suppose we want to gure out whether a particular link (u,v) exists in a network, Similarity
Score can be used to quantify the topology properties of node u and v (e.g., common neigh-
bors, degrees), and a higher Similarity Score indicates a greater likelihood of connection
between this pair. Usually, Similarity Score could be measured by the cosine similarity
matrix [58].
• Test Statistic Λ. Λ takes advantage of the distribution of node degrees to measure the
similarity between graphs. Specically, Zu¨gner et al. [85] state that multiset of node degrees
dG in the graph G follow the power-law like distribution, and they provide a method to
approximate the main parameter αG of the distribution. rough αG and dG , we can
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calculate G’s log-likelihood score l(dG ,αG ). For the pre-aack graph Gpr and post-aack
graph Gpo , we get (dGpr ,αGpr ) and (dGpo ,αGpo ), respectively. Similarly, we can then dene
dGq = dGpr ∩ dGpo and estimate αGq . e nal test statistic of graphs can be formulated as:
Λ(Gpr ,Gpo) = 2 · (−l(dGq ,αGq )
+ l(dGpo ,αGpo ) + l(dGpr ,αGpr ))
(19)
Finally, when the statistic Λ satises a specied constraint, the model considers the pertur-
bations are unnoticeable.
• Attack Budget ∆. To ensure unnoticeable perturbations in the aack, previous work
[85] measures the perturbations in terms of the budget ∆ and the test statistics Λ w.r.t.
log-likelihood score. More precisely, they accumulate the changes in node feature and the
adjacency matrix, and limit it to a budge ∆ to constrain perturbations. However, it is not
suitable to deal with complicated situations [85].
• Attack Eect. Generally, the aack eect evaluates the impacts in the community detec-
tion task. Given a confusion matrix J , where each element Ji, j represents the number of
shared nodes between original community and a perturbed one, the aack eect is simply
dened as the accumulation of normalized entropy [9]. Suppose all the communities keep
exactly the same aer the aack, the aack eect will be equal to 0.
6 OPEN PROBLEMS
Graph adversarial learning has many problems worth to be studied by observing existing researches.
In this section, we try to introduce several major research issues and discuss the potential solutions.
Generally, we will discuss the open problems in three parts: aack, defense and evaluation metric.
6.1 Aack
We mainly approach the problems from three perspectives, aacks’ side eects, performance,
and prerequisites. First, we hope the inevitable disturbances in the aack can be stealthy and
unnoticeable. Second, now that data is huge, aacks need to be ecient and scalable. Finally, the
premise of the aack should not be too ideal, that is, it should be practical and feasible. Based on
the limitations of previous works detailed in Section 3.3.2 and the discussion above, we rise several
open problems in the following:
• Unnoticeable Attack. Adversaries want to keep the aack unnoticeable to avoid censor-
ship. To this end, Zu¨gner et al. [86] argue that the main property of the graph should be
marginally changed aer aack, e.g., aackers are restricted to maintain the degree distri-
bution while aacking a specied graph, which is evaluated via a test static. Nevertheless,
most of existing works ignore such a constraint despite achieving outstanding performance.
To be more concealed, we believe that aackers should focus more on their perturbation
impacts on a target graph, with more constraints placed on the aacks.
• Ecient and Eective Algorithms. Seeing from Table 2, the most frequently used
benchmark datasets are rather small-scale graphs, e.g., Cora [42] and Citeseer [54]. Cur-
rently, the majority of proposed methods are failed to aack a large-scale graph, for the
reason that they need to store the entire information of the graph to compute the surrogate
gradients or loss even with small changes, leading to the expensive computation and mem-
ory consumption. To address this problem, Zu¨gner et al. [86] make an eort that derives
an incremental update for all candidate set (potential perturbation edges) with a linear
variant of GCN, which avoid the redundant computation while remain ecient aack
performance. Unfortunately, the proposed method isn’t suitable for a larger-scale graph
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yet. With the shortcoming that unable to conduct aacks on a larger-scale graph, a more
ecient and eective aack method should be studied to address this practical problem.
For instance, given a target node, the message propagation are only exits within its k-hops
neighborhood.4 In other words, we believe that adversaries can explore a heuristic method
to aack an entire graph (large) via its represented subgraph (small), and naturally the
complexity of time and space are reduced.
• Constraints on Attackers’ Knowledge. To conduct a real and practical black-box aack,
aackers should not only be blind to the model knowledge, but also be strict to minimal
data knowledge. is is a challenging seing from the perspective of aackers. Chen et al.
[17] explore this seing by randomly sampling dierent size of subgraphs, showing that
the aacks are failed with a small network size, and the performance increases as it gets
larger. However, few works are aware of the constraints on aackers’ knowledge, instead,
they assume that perfect knowledge of the input data are available, and naturally perform
well in aacking a fully “exposed” graph. erefore, several works could be explored with
such a strict constraint, e.g., aackers can train a substitute model on a certain part of the
graph, learn the general paerns of conducting aacks on graph data, thus transfer to other
models and entire graph with less prior knowledge.
• Real-world Attack. Aacks can’t always be on an ideal assumption, i.e., studying aacks
on a simple and static graphs. Such ideal, undistorted input is unrealistic in real cases.
In other words, how can we improve existing models so that they can work in complex
real-world environments?
6.2 Defense
Besides the open problems of aack mentioned above, there are still many interesting problems in
defense on the graph, which deserve more aentions. Here we list some open problems that worth
discussing:
• Defense on Various Tasks. From table 3 we can see that, most existing works of defense
[33, 67, 72, 75, 87] are focusing on the node classication task on graph, achieving promising
performance. Except for node classication, there are various tasks on graph domain are
important and should be pay more aention to. However, only a few works [50, 81] try
to investigate and improve model robustness on link prediction task on graph while a
few works [28, 29, 31] make an eort to defense on some tasks (e.g., malware detection,
anomaly detection, recommendation) on other graph domains. erefore, it is valuable
to think about how to improve model robustness on various tasks or transfer the current
defense methods to other tasks.
• Ecient Defense. Training cost is critical important factor to be taken into consideration
under the industrial scenes. erefore, it’s worth to be studied how to guarantee acceptable
cost while improving robustness. However, the currently proposed defense methods have
rarely discussed the space-time eciency of their algorithms. Wang et al. [67] design
a boleneck mapping to reduce the dimension of input for a beer eciency, but their
experiments absence the consideration of large-scale graph. Zu¨gner et al. [87] test the
number of coverage iterations of their certication methods under the dierent number
of nodes, but the datasets they used are still small. Wang et al. [69] do not restrict the
regularized adjacency matrix to be discrete during the training process, which improves
the training eciency.
4Here k depends on the specied method of message propagation and is usually of a smaller value, e.g., k = 2 with a
two-layer GCN.
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• Certication on Robustness. Robustness of the graph model is always the main issue
among all the existing works including aack and defense mentioned above. However, most
researchers only focus on improving model (e.g., GCN) robustness, and try to prove the
model robustness via the performance results of their model. e experimental results can
indeed prove the robustness of the model to a certain extent. However, considering that the
model performance is easily inuenced by the hyperparameters, implementation method,
random initialization, and even some hardware constraints (e.g., cpu, gpu, memory), it
is dicult to guarantee that the promising and stable performance can be reobtained on
dierent scenarios (e.g., datasets, tasks, parameter seings). ere is a novel and cheaper
way to prove robustness via certication that should be taken more seriously into consider-
ation, which certicate the node’s absolute robustness under arbitrary perturbations, but
currently only a few works have paid aention to the certication of GNNs’ robustness
[3, 87] which are also a valuable research direction.
6.3 Evaluation Metric
As seen in Section 5, we got so many evaluation metrics in graph adversarial learning eld, however,
the number of eectiveness-relevant metrics are far more than the other two, which reects the
research emphasis on model performance is unbalanced. erefore, we propose several potential
works can be further studied:
• Measurement of Cost. ere are not many metrics to explore the model’s eciency
which reects the lack of research aention on it. e known methods roughly measure
the cost via the number of modied edges which begs the question that is there another
perspective to quantify the cost of aack and defense more precisely? In real world, the cost
of adding an edge is rather dierent from removing one,5 thus the cost between modied
edges are unbalanced, which needs more reasonable evaluation metrics.
• Measurement of Imperceptibility. Dierent from the image data, where the perturba-
tions are bounded in `p -norm [26, 40, 57], and could be used as an evaluation metric on
aack impacts, but it is ill-dened on graph data. erefore, how to beer measure the
eect of perturbations and make the aack more unnoticeable?
• Appropriate Metric Selection. With so many metrics proposed to evaluate the perfor-
mance of the aack and defense algorithms, here comes a problem that how to determine
the evaluation metrics in dierent scenarios?
7 CONCLUSION
In this survey, we conduct a comprehensive review on graph adversarial learning, including aacks,
defenses and corresponding evaluation metrics. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst
work systemically summarize the extensive works in this eld. Specically, we present the recent
developments of this area and introduce the arms race between aackers and defenders. Besides,
we provide a reasonable taxonomy for both of them, and further give a unied problem formulation
which makes it clear and understandable. Moreover, under the scenario of graph adversarial
learning, we summarize and discuss the major contributions and limitations of current aack and
defense methods respectively, along with the open problems of this area that worth exploring. Our
works cover most of the relevant evaluation metrics in the graph adversarial learning eld as well,
aiming to provide a beer understanding on these methods. In the future, we will measure the
performance of proposed models with relevant metrics based on extensive empirical studies.
5Usually, removing an edge is more expensive than adding one.
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Hopefully, our works will serve as a reference and give researchers a comprehensive and system-
atical understanding of the fundamental issues, thus become a well starting point to study in this
eld.
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